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Elections constitute a paradigm of decision-making problems that have puzzled experts of differ-
ent disciplines for decades. We study two decision-making problems, where groups make decisions
that impact only themselves as a group. In both studied cases, participation in local elections and
the number of democratic representatives at different scales (from local to national), we observe a
universal scaling with the constituency size. These results may be interpreted as constituencies hav-
ing a hierarchical structure, where each group of N agents, at each level of the hierarchy, is divided
in about Nδ subgroups with δ ≈ 1/3. Following this interpretation, we propose a phenomenological
model of vote participation where abstention is related to the perceived link of an agent to the rest
of the constituency and which reproduces quantitatively the observed data.
PACS numbers: 89.65.-s, 89.75.Da, 89.75.Fb
I. INTRODUCTION
Elections are an excellent tool with which to study
decision-making processes. Unlike declarative opinion
polls where the obtained data may be affected by dif-
ferent biases, elections are an occasion where objective
and reliable data about the opinion of a significant num-
ber of people are gathered. If we were to see the opinion
dynamics as a natural process, the results of elections
would play the role of observed quantities.
Traditionally, studies of opinion dynamics in the
physics community are posed as a direct problem. Au-
thors make assumptions on the way people interact with
each other and consequently build a model of opinion
spreading based on these assumptions [1, 2]. These mod-
els successfully describe the qualitative evolution of opin-
ion at a macroscopic level.
More recently, the community has undertaken to study
inverse problems in opinion dynamics. Several au-
thors [3–14] have focused on data in the hope of find-
ing regularities, often called stylized facts, before trying
to find the underlying mechanisms leading to them. For
example, it has been found that the distribution of the
number of votes received by candidates is a universal scal-
ing function, suggesting that the global opinion forms in
a branching process [5]. Also, spatial and temporal regu-
larities observed in the results of French elections [8] and
the strong spatial correlations observed in the turnout
rate of elections in many different countries [11], may be
interpreted in terms of the existence of a ‘cultural field’
whose dynamics obeys a two-dimensional random diffu-
sion equation. So far, the observed regularities indicate
that the processes at stake in opinion formation are sim-
ilar, irrespective of the social, cultural and economical
background of the voters.
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In this work we present results regarding two different
decision-making processes. First we consider the partic-
ipation to local elections (elections of the Mayor or mu-
nicipal councillors). We have gathered and analyzed data
from 21 elections in 10 different countries (see Tab. I)
with different social, economical, and cultural character-
istics. The regularities observed in these data lead us to
study the number of representatives to different cham-
bers in different countries (from local to national level).
Finally, we propose a phenomenological model which ac-
counts for the empirical regularities and brings a new
outlook on the reasons behind abstention in local elec-
tions.
II. ANALYSIS OF LOCAL ELECTIONS
By local elections, we mean elections in municipal dis-
tricts which go from small villages of hundreds of inhabi-
tants to large cities of hundreds of thousand inhabitants.
(Details on data analysis are given in the Appendix; data
may be downloaded from Ref. [15]).
The elections chosen for this study satisfy the follow-
ing properties: (1) voting is not compulsory, (2) there are
enough available data so as to ensure good statistics (typ-
ically more than 2000 municipalities), (3) the elections
concern only local issues, (4) the number of registered
voters is well known.
For each municipality and each election, we denote
by N the total number of registered voters, N+ the
total turnout and N− the total number of abstentions
(N = N+ + N−). We define the logarithmic turnout
rate (LTR) as τ = ln
(
N+
N
−
)
, a symmetric and unbounded
variable, that highlights statistical regularities appearing
over different elections and countries [8, 11, 16, 17].
We first study the dependence of the average LTR, the
first moment of P (τ |N), with the size of the considered
municipality (Fig. 1A). Each point corresponds to the
2TABLE I. Local elections analyzed in this paper. The Mun
column indicates the number of municipalities involved in the
election (rounded up or down to the nearest 100, except for
Israel); the Kind column indicates whether there is only a
single round (m) or two, in which case m1 and m2 mean first
or the second round respectively. Finally the Years column
gives the year of the studied elections for each country. In the
particular case of Israel, (J) indicates municipalities where the
majority of population is Jewish and (A) those where most of
the population is Arab. The horizontal line separate elections
that show a deviation from the universal behavior (see text).
Country Mun Kind Years
Austria (At) 2400 m 2004, 2009
Costa Rica (CR) 1900 m 2002, 2006
Czech Rep. (Cz) 6400 m 2002, 2006, 2010
France (Fr) 36000 m1 2001, 2008
Poland (Pl) 750 m2 2006, 2010
Romania (Ro) 3200 m1 2012
Slovakia (Sk) 2900 m 2006, 2010
Spain (Sp) 2000 m 1991, 1995, 1999
2003, 2007, 2011
Israel (Is) (J) 100 m 2008
Portugal (Pt) 4100 m 2009
Spain (Sp) 2000 m 1987
Israel (Is) (A) 50 m 2008
average value of τ over municipalities of about the same
size (see the Appendix). The behavior of the average
LTR of each election can be correctly fitted by:
〈τ〉(N) ≈ C − α ln(N) , (1)
where C is an election-dependent constant. Strikingly,
the shape of 〈τ〉(N) does not depend on the country that
is being studied. Moreover, we find that the slope α is
the same for most of the studied elections, fluctuating
around an average value of α ≈ 0.31, as is shown in
Table II. This behavior holds for elections that have a
global turnout rate ranging from 18% to 88%, implying
that the observed behavior is independent of the total
participation to a given election. The quality of the fit,
excluding very small and very large sizes, is very good
(R2 > 0.95).
Interestingly, the variance σ2τ (N) of P (τ |N) also ex-
hibits regularities, even though the curves are noisier
than for the first moment (Fig. 1B). We fit these curves
assuming a power-law dependency with constituency size
and we find
σ2τ (N) ≈
D
Nβ
, (2)
whereD is a constant of the order of unity which depends
on the election. The exponent, β, is the same for most of
studied elections and fluctuates around an average value
of β ≈ 0.32 (see Tab. II).
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FIG. 1. (Color online) LTR, τ as a function of the munici-
pality size N for different local elections (for the sake of clar-
ity we plot only one election for each country; the remaining
ones may be found in Fig. 2). An election is identified by
the country and the corresponding year. (A) Average value,
〈τ 〉(N). In order to better show the universality of the scaling
as a function of N , curves have been shifted to make them
coincident with the French election (the original curves are
shown in the inset). In Israel, only municipalities with Jewish
majority are shown. (B) variance, σ2τ (N) of the conditional
distribution P (τ |N). Due to poor statistics, σ2τ (N) is shown
for neither Israeli nor Polish elections. See the Appendix for
more details on the data analysis.
As expected, the quality of the fit of σ2τ (N) is worse
than that of 〈τ〉(N). Moreover, each point of the curve of
Fig. 1B corresponds to the variance of LTR over munici-
palities of a given size. Because this number is character-
istic of each country, the quality of the statistics cannot
be improved. Without surprise, the best fit corresponds
to the case of France where each point corresponds to
200 municipalities of very similar size and where never-
theless, the number of obtained points is large (see the
Appendix for details on all elections). We have compared
this fit with other plausible decreasing functions like the
exponential, the stretched exponential, and the inverse
function. For all these functions of two parameters, the
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FIG. 2. (Color online) Comparison of the behavior of 〈τ 〉 for local and national elections, as a function of the municipality
size, N . An election is identified by the country, the corresponding year and its type m: Municipal election (in black, red and
green), E: European parliament election (in cyan), P: Presidential election (in orange), D: Parlement election (in brown), R:
referendum (in violet). Averages have been calculated over the same number of municipalities as in Fig. 1, with the exception
of national Polish elections, where the statistics is better than for local elections.
TABLE II. Exponents α of 〈τ 〉(N) and β of σ2τ (N) from fits
to Eqs. (1) and (2), respectively, for all the elections in eight
out of the nine countries shown in the upper part of Table I. α
and β are measured only in the range where Eqs. (1) and (2)
hold (see Figs. 1 and 2). For Polish elections β is not included
in the average because of its very poor statistics.
At CR Cz Fr Pl Ro Sk Sp average ± stdev
α ≈ 0.36 0.25 0.28 0.29 0.37 0.31 0.32 0.27 0.31 ± 0.04
β ≈ 0.34 0.21 0.41 0.33 0.26 0.35 0.34 0.32 ± 0.06
obtained fit was clearly worse. We have also tried a loga-
rithmic binning, which does not change the nature of the
results.
It is worth noticing the difference between these results
and those issued from previous studies of the LTR in the
case of non-local elections for the same constituencies [11]
(shown in Fig. 2). The universal behavior of 〈τ〉(N) we
just exhibited for local elections does not hold for na-
tional elections, where the curve may change not only
from one country to another, but also from one election
to another in the same country. Similar findings apply
to the comparison between the variances, σ2τ (N), of local
and national elections though the curves are, as expected,
noisier than for the first moment. Hence we conclude
that the aforementioned regularities arise only when the
purpose of the election solely concerns the interests of the
constituency (here, the municipalities). Furthermore, our
results go far beyond the confirmation of the well known
fact that the electoral participation decreases with the
constituency size (although there are exceptions to this
rule for non-local elections, as shown in fig. 2). In par-
ticular we showed that, in the case of local elections, the
decrease of 〈τ〉(N) and σ2τ (N) is the same, irrespective
of the election date or the country considered.
We have studied the robustness of the observed be-
havior when data are grouped according to the different
regions or provinces inside a given country. The results
are shown in Fig. 3 for French elections (we chose France
because it has many more municipalities than other coun-
tries, leading to a better statistics). The data split into
regions exhibit the same regularities as previously de-
scribed for countries. For instance, the average 〈τ〉(N)
for different regions follows the equation (1), with the
same slope α (and with different shifts C) that we ob-
tained when all the municipalities in the country were
considered. Also, the results depend neither on the vot-
ing rules nor on the rural/urban character of the mu-
nicipalities. In France, for instance, the voting rule is
different according to the population of the municipality
(the limit being 3500 inhabitants). Fig. 4A shows that
there is no kink in the slope of the line 〈τ〉(N) when the
voting rule changes. Moreover, both curves fit the same
line, thus indicating that the total turnout rate describes
a property of that particular electoral event. We are able
to separate rural from urban municipalities in Romanian
data. As shown in Fig. 4B, the behavior of the LTR is
not different between both cases. This result, we believe,
strengthens our claim that the population size effect in
local elections is universal.
To further check the robustness of our measures, we
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FIG. 3. (Color online) (A) Average, 〈τ 〉(N), and (B) vari-
ance, σ2τ (N), of the LTR corresponding to the 2001 local elec-
tion, plotted for each French region. Curves for all munici-
palities (Fr-2001), as in Fig. 1, are also plotted for reference.
have evaluated the average of LTR (i.e., 〈τ〉(N)) over
municipalities with approximatively the same size N ,
in a different way. Instead of averaging τ over, for
instance, 100 municipalities of size ≈ N as for 〈τ〉(N),
we evaluate the LTR of an artificial town which results
from aggregating data of these 100 municipalities. 1 The
result obtained computing the LTR in this way are very
similar to those described above (but the information on
the variance is obviously lost).
Let us now consider the cases where the described uni-
versal behavior does not hold (lower part of Table I). In
Portuguese elections, a cutoff is imposed to large cities:
they are divided into freguesias of N ≤ 40000. In this
way, as large cities are divided, small or average con-
stituencies are created, thus artificially modifying the
number of the municipalities of a given size. This sit-
1 Let us consider 100 municipalities, i, of size ≈ N ; each one with
a number of registered voters Ni (i = 1, 2, ...,100), a number of
voters Ni,+ which leads to its LTR τi = ln(
Ni,+
Ni−Ni,+
). Accord-
ing to what precedes, 〈τ〉(N) = 1/100
∑100
i=1
τi. We can define
another kind of average LTR over these 100 municipalities by
ln
( ∑
100
i=1
Ni,+∑100
i=1
(Ni−Ni,+)
)
.
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FIG. 4. (Color online) Robustness of the average LTR 〈τ 〉(N)
behavior in local elections. (A) Lack of influence of the vot-
ing rule, for French municipalities smaller and larger than the
threshold limit of 3500 inhabitants. (B) Lack of influence of
the rural or urban character of municipalities on the regular-
ities observed in local elections (2012 Romanian election).
uation mainly concerns the province of Lisboa. However
there are other provinces (regio˜es) where there are very
few municipalities that reach the threshold ofN = 40000,
and still these provinces (North and Centro) do not show
the universal behavior of the average 〈τ〉(N) previously
exhibited. At the same time, other provinces like Alen-
tejo and Algarve or the two islands Ac¸ores and Madeira
show the aforementioned regularities. Nevertheless, ag-
gregating data at the level of the country (in order to have
enough statistics), the σ2τ (N) behaves in agreement with
Eq. (2), with the exponent β ≈ 0.34. We have neither
an organizational nor a sociological or historical explana-
tion for the single case of Spanish elections (1987) which
is an exception to the observed universal behavior of the
average LTR. However, we observe that σ2τ (N) behaves
in agreement with Eq. (2), with the exponent β ≈ 0.37.
These results are shown in Fig. 5.
The anomalous behavior of Israeli elections is par-
ticularly interesting. When plotting data of all the
municipalities of the country, the behavior described
by Eq. (1) is not observed, but as is shown in Fig. 6,
when splitting data into municipalities with a majority
of Jewish population on one side and with a majority
of Arab population on the other, one retrieves the
regularities in the first case but not in the second. This
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FIG. 5. (Color online) Exceptions to the universal behavior of
LTR; in all the panels we plot the 2001 local French election
(Fr-2001) as a reference. (A and B) 〈τ 〉(N) and σ2τ (N), re-
spectively, for local elections in Portugal (Pt) and Spain (Sp).
(C) The Portuguese 2009 local election, different curves cor-
respond to to municipalities of different regions.
result reinforces the idea that the observed regularities
reveal some property of the group.
Finally, we want to point out that the LTR is, among
other variables measuring vote participation, particu-
larly interesting when it comes to exhibiting regularities.
Indeed, the average value of the turnout rate p also
shows a linear decay with log(N) as in Eq. (1), but
the slope is not universal. Moreover, the variance of p
(the equivalent for p of σ2τ (N)) does not exhibit any
regularity when plotted as a function of N . One possible
reason for this, is that unlike τ , p is bounded (p ∈ [0, 1]).
Other quantities like the involvement entropy [12] do not
show clear quantitative regularities.
We would now like to study how the constituency size
influences the LTR. We begin by noting that Eq. (2) in-
dicates that the LTR cannot be understood as resulting
from a process where the voters act independently (in
such a case one must find σ2 ≈ 1/N). On the contrary,
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FIG. 6. (Color online) Exceptions to the universal behav-
ior of LTR. Scatter plot of the local elections in Israel; in
red, municipalities with a majority of Arab population, in
black, municipalities with a majority of Jewish population.
The straight line corresponds to the fit of the black dots
〈τ 〉(N) ≈ 3.6 − 0.32 ln(N).
it is compatible with a subdivision of the constituency of
size N into ng ≈ Nβ independent groups. In order to fur-
ther investigate this hypothesis, we study how the num-
ber of democratic representatives of a given constituency
scales with its size. The intuition is that, if significant,
this group structure must be mirrored in the political or-
ganization at different scales. It is also interesting to note
at this point that from the fit of Eqs. (1) and (2), α ≈ β.
In this case, Eq. (1) reads d〈τ〉 ≈ −dngng , consistent with
ng = N
β. This point will be used later in the formulation
of a phenomenological model.
III. NUMBER OF DEMOCRATIC
REPRESENTATIVES
We have gathered and analyzed data regarding
the number of representatives, nr, of different demo-
cratic assemblies as a function of the constituency
size, for different countries and scales (municipality,
state/region/province, country). We consider only elec-
tions where the representatives are directly elected by
the citizens, and for states or countries with bicameral
legislatures, only the lower house (or House of Repre-
sentatives) is considered (see details in the Appendix).
Fig. 7 shows the dependence of the number of the repre-
sentatives on the size of the constituency at national and
municipal scales.
A power law correctly fits the data over five decades,
giving:
nr ∼ ENγ , (3)
with E being a chamber-dependent constant of the order
of the unity. Again, the exponent is γ ≈ 1/3. Tab. III
gives the details of the fitting parameters.
The case of Germany is particularly interesting because
the behavior described by Eq. (3) still holds (see Fig. 8),
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FIG. 7. (Color online) Log-log plot of the total number of
democratic representatives, nr, at municipal and national
scales as a function of the total number of registered vot-
ers, N , or the population size, pop. (A) Municipal councils.
For the three cases of the main panel, plotted as a function
of the population size, the electoral regulations impose that
all the cities with a population between two given values have
the same number of representatives. The error bars represent
the corresponding interval. In the inset we plot the num-
ber of representatives in municipal assemblies in Slovakia and
the Czech Republic as a function of the registered voters. In
these cases the corresponding number is given city by city.
The points represent the average value of the number of reg-
istered voters N of the cities having the same nr and the bars
the standard deviation. (B) National chambers. In the main
panel, number of representatives as a function of N of all the
considered countries. In the inset, the same countries appear
grouped by continents.
despite the fact that the rules fixing the number of rep-
resentatives to municipal councils are different from one
Land to another.
These results hold for representative assemblies at all
scales. For the intermediate scale (called regions, states,
or provinces, according to the country) data are extended
over fewer than two decades which is too small an interval
to fit a power law with good confidence. Nevertheless, if
we do so the results of the fit are compatible with those
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FIG. 8. (Color online) Number of representatives to town
councils in different German La¨nder. The electoral rule fix-
ing the number of representatives as a function of the popu-
lation is different for each Land. The case of Bavaria (the one
spreading the largest range of constituency sizes) is plotted
in Fig. 7A.
found for other scales. We alternatively show the ratio
nr/N
1/3, which corresponds to the prefactor E of Eq. 3
in the case where γ = 1/3, on Fig. 9. This quantity lies
in the range 0.2 <∼ E <∼ 1.1.
It is interesting to note that the behavior given by
Eq. (3), does not depend on the particular type of demo-
cratic chamber even at a given scale. For instance, in the
Czech Republic, different democratic assemblies exists
at the municipal scale: Municipal Council, Town Coun-
cil, Statutory Town Council, Prague City Assembly, City
Part/District Council, Market Town Council, etc. The
results for these assemblies are shown in Fig. 10.
In order to investigate the behavior of nr as a function
of other extensive variables characterizing the studied
population, we have plotted the nr of national assemblies
as a function of surface of the country S, and the nomi-
nal gross domestic product (GDP). The results shown in
Table IV confirm that, among the variables studied here,
the best fit to a power law is obtained as a function of
N .
This power-law dependence can be easily obtained
7TABLE III. Power-law fits of nr with respect to N at municipal and national scales (for municipal representatives in France,
Catalonia and German La¨nder, data are given in terms of the population, pop, instead). The goodness of fit for municipal
representatives is in each case R2 > 0.97 (R2 values for national ones are indicated in Tab. IV).
Municipal scale France 2.8 pop0.26 Catalonia (Sp) 1.4 pop0.25 Bavaria (Ge) 1.4 pop0.30
Brandenburg (Ge) 1.0 pop0.34 Hesse (Ge) 2.2 pop0.29 Mecklenburg-W. Pomer. (Ge) 1.1 pop0.32
Saxony (Ge) 1.5 pop0.29 Schleswig-Holstein (Ge) 1.7 pop0.28 Thuringia (Ge) 1.1 pop0.32
Slovakia 0.75N0.34 Czech Republic 1.7N0.28
National scale all 0.49N0.37 Africa 0.39N0.39 America 0.24N0.40
Asia & M.East 0.60N0.36 Europe 0.69N0.36 Oceania 0.89N0.33
TABLE IV. Power-law fits of the total number of deputies with respect to an extensive quantity of the considered country.
Parameters of the fit are written on the left, while the goodness of fit R2 is on the right. The extensive quantities are the
number of registered voters (N), the total area (S in km2), and the nominal gross domestic product (GDP , in billion US $).
The total number of considered countries per continent or for the world (all) is given in parentheses.
all (181) Africa (50) America (34) Asia & M.E. (34) Europe (46) Oceania (17)
N 0.49N0.37 0.84 0.39N0.39 0.79 0.24N0.40 0.93 0.60N0.36 0.81 0.69N0.36 0.84 0.89N0.33 0.91
S 7.3S0.25 0.60 6.6S0.26 0.56 3.7S0.28 0.84 18S0.19 0.28 11S0.25 0.63 6.1S0.25 0.80
GDP 51GDP 0.26 0.48 97GDP 0.14 0.11 28GDP 0.31 0.80 67GDP 0.22 0.26 45GDP 0.29 0.47 44GDP 0.28 0.83
105 106 107N
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
n
r
/ N
1/
3
0 0.5 1 1.5
n
r
 / N1/3
0
2
Regional scale
1.12
0.18
FIG. 9. (Color online) Prefactor E = nr/N
1/3 of the power-
law fit of nr with γ = 1/3 (see Eq. (3)), for 197 Re-
gional/States Chambers in 11 countries: nine in Austria, 27
in Brazil, 13 in Czech Republic, 26 in France, 16 in Germany,
21 in Italy, 16 in Poland, two in Portugal, 42 in Romania,
eight in Slovakia, and 17 in Spain. Inset: Histogram of the
prefactor E for these Chambers.
using the following heuristic, which is reminiscent of
the least difficulty principle [18]. A good representa-
tive democracy must meet two competing requirements.
First, it must maximize the representativeness, that is
to say, the number nr of representatives should be such
that the average number of citizens per representative
N1 = N/nr is as small as possible. On the other hand,
it must be efficient: in order to make decisions a rea-
sonable number of interactions among the nr represen-
tatives should take place. The higher this number of
interactions, the more difficult it is to make a decision.
Roughly, if one considers all pairwise interactions, the
corresponding term is of the order of n2r. Therefore, a
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FIG. 10. (Color online) Number of councillors at municipal
scale for different kind of assemblies in the Czech Republic.
In brackets, the number of councils of each kind. In this case
the corresponding number of representatives is given city by
city; the points represent the average number of registered
voters of the considered cities that have the same number of
representatives. The line corresponds to the power-law fit of
all the points.
‘good’ representative regime is such that the function:
F = N1 + An2r, where A is a measure of the relative
importance of representativeness and efficiency, is mini-
mum. This leads immediately to nr ≈ N1/3, which is in
the range of the observed values.
A short historical investigation of the behavior of the
number of representatives with the size of the respective
constituencies in old democratic assemblies can be found
in the Appendix, which in most of the cases do not cor-
respond to the behavior described here. One reason for
this discrepancy could be the fact that those ancient as-
semblies did not correspond to a democratic regime as
8we understand it nowadays.
The evolution of the number of representatives of one
assembly with time is possible in the case of the United
States, where an important increase of the population
(compared to European democracies) occurs along with
a stable democratic regime. The results obtained (see
the Appendix) are compatible with the behavior of the
nr described here.
IV. PHENOMENOLOGICAL MODEL FOR
LOCAL ELECTIONS
The main idea behind the following phenomenological
model is quite simple: when facing a decision, N agents
behave as if they were grouped into ng ≈ N δ subgroups,
with δ ≈ 1/3. This idea is suggested by the observed
organization of constituencies into groups, which holds
for different scales, and the fact that α ≈ β ≈ γ ≈ 1/3.
We do not make any assumption about the exact nature
or the origin of these groups; this problem lies beyond the
scope of this study. We just assume that people belonging
to a given subgroup share some common traits. This
organization in groups is assumed to go on at all scales,
reflecting a hierarchy of differences among agents (as the
subdivisions go on, agents inside the same group are more
and more similar one to another).
Our assumptions relate to the problem of vote partic-
ipation in local elections in the following way. Let x be
a random variable characterizing the propensity of one
agent to go to vote to a particular election. x is the
sum of two independent contributions: the first one, ζ
(i.i.d. with variance σ2ζ ), characterizes the propensity
of people belonging to the same group, and the one, ǫ,
represents the variability of the individual. ǫ may fluc-
tuate around the average value of the group’s propen-
sity, with variance σ2ǫ . Hence, an agent i who belongs
to the group gi is characterized by a propensity to vote:
xi = ζgi + ǫi. Assuming that there are N agents dis-
tributed in ng groups of approximatively the same size,
the variance of Σ = 1N
∑N
i=1 xi (representing the total
propensity to vote) is V ar(Σ) = 1ng σ
2
ζ+
1
N σ
2
ǫ . If ng ≈ N δ
the previous equation yields, for N ≫ 1 and for σ2ζ and
σ2ǫ of the same order magnitude: V ar(Σ) ≈ 1ng σ2ζ , which
is the dependency that we observe in data with δ ≈ 1/3.
In what follows we will take δ = 1/3.
Due to the scale invariance of 〈τ〉 and σ2τ we assume
that N individuals form n1 groups (with n1 ≈ N1/3),
of approximately N1 individuals each, and each of these
groups subdivide again in approximatively n2 subgroups
(with n2 ≈ N1/31 ) with N2 individuals in each subgroup,
and so on as is depicted in Fig. 11. Successive groups
form a hierarchical organization, the constituency as a
whole at the highest level. As the number of subgroups
at each level fluctuates (see, for example, at level l =
1, the group of N1 individuals subdivides into n2 = 3
subgroups but the neighboring group of N ′1 individuals
subdivides into n′2 = 2 subgroups), the length of all the
branches (a branch stops when the group is too small,
namely, one single individual) is not the same. We note
d(i) = lf (i), where lf(i) is the final level of agent i, the
total distance of an agent with respect to the highest level
in the hierarchy, namely, the whole population N .
The intention to vote of the agent i, Ci, depends on
three different components. First, the idiosyncratic part
H(i) reflects the intrinsic tendency of agents to vote or
not, relative to their cultural, social, etc., background.
We assume that agents belonging to the same group share
the same idiosyncrasy. Furthermore, we assume that the
groups at level ℓ+ 1, issued from the same parent group
at level ℓ, share some common trait, while having some
variability which accounts for the differences emerging at
smaller scales. We thus write for the idiosyncrasy of a
group at level ℓ+1,Hℓ+1 = Hℓ+γℓ+1, where γℓ is random
variable of zero mean and whose variance decreases with
ℓ. This decrease stands for the fact that differences be-
come smaller at a smaller scale. The particular decrease
law of the variance is irrelevant. Here, for simplicity con-
siderations, we have chosen a variance proportional to
1/2ℓ. 2 We have tested different decreasing laws for the
variance (proportional to 1/22l, to 1/l or to 1/l2), and
we have retrieved the same behavior.
Second, we assume that the agent i’s intention to vote
also depends on his or her perceived link to the whole
constituency. In other words, the intention to vote on
a collective issue depends on how strong the feeling of
belonging to that collectivity is. We represent this com-
ponent by the final number of levels d(i) that separates
a citizen from the higher level, the whole constituency.
Finally, the average intention to vote of the global pop-
ulation is represented by a global field Fnat that is a
constant over all the municipalities of a country, for each
election. Thus, the intention to vote of the agent i finally
reads
Ci = H(i)− d(i) + Fnat , (4)
and following Refs. [2, 8, 11], the decision to vote (1) or
not to vote (0) is given by Si = Θ(Ci), where Θ is the
Heaviside function.
The national average of the LTR does not play any
role in the observed universal behavior of local elections.
Thus, the average LTR depends on the variance of the
group-idiosyncratic term H(i) and, if the distribution of
d(i) is not too broad (as it is the case here), on the average
total distance of an agent with respect to the original
population, 〈d(i)〉(N). This distance is determined by
the small randomness in the group distribution of each
realization, so the only free parameter of the model is the
variance of the distribution of idiosyncrasies at a given
level.
2 In this case, the variance of Hℓ is proportional to 1/2 + 1/4 +
1/8 + . . .+ 1/2ℓ which is ≈ 1 for ℓ ≫ 1.
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FIG. 11. (Color online) Phenomenological Model. At each
level ℓ, a group of size Nl includes ≈ N
1/3
ℓ subgroups of size
Nℓ+1, i.e., Nℓ+1 = N
2/3
l (1 + η) where η represents a small
noise. The group-idiosyncrasy of the agent i at its final level,
lf (i), is simply called Hlf (i) = H(i) and lf (i) = d(i). For in-
stance, the agent represented by the gray-filled box (ancestors
marked in red) has the group-idiosyncrasy H(i) = H4 and a
distance d(i) = 4.
It can easily be seen that the mathematical expression
of the LTR, τ , obtained from the data, is particularly
convenient for idiosyncrasies distributed according to
a logistic distribution of zero mean. Let us recall that
the probability that an agent, taken at random, will
vote is p = N+N , for large N . Then, from the definition
τ = ln( N+N−N+ ), one gets: p =
1
1+e−τ . On the other hand,
let Hℓ, in Eq. (4), be a random variable distributed
accordingly to a logistic distribution with zero mean
and a scale parameter s, and let also, for simplicity,
d(i) = d ∀i. Then p = P(Ci > 0) = 1
1+e−(F−d)/s
in
the large N limit. This yields τ = (F − d)/s. For
convenience, γ can also be sampled from a logistic
distribution without loss of generality. Then the only
free parameter of the model is s, the scale parameter
of the logistic distribution. The model agrees with the
empirical observations for s ≈ 1. Indeed, following the
chosen form for the decrease with ℓ of the variance of γℓ,
the scale parameter at the level ℓ ≥ 1 of the distribution
of γℓ is s/
√
2ℓ.
We have performed simulations over 200 realizations
of the group distribution for a given N , each leading
to a different realization of the hierarchy depicted in
Fig. 11. For each realization and for each group at the
level ℓ, the size of subgroups at level ℓ + 1 is such that
Nℓ+1 = N
2/3
ℓ (1+η). The noise, η, is taken from a Gaus-
sian distribution with zero mean, and standard deviation
equal to 0.2. This small irrelevant noise is introduced in
order to avoid steplike curves. We have calculated, us-
ing Eq. (4) and the voting rule, the corresponding 〈τ〉
and σ2τ . The results, shown by the continuous line of
Fig. 1, have the same behavior as the observed curves.
Notice that the model imposes that the simulated σ2τ (N)
behaves as 1/Nβ (with β ≈ 0.3) but interestingly, the
obtained prefactor is very near to the one issued from
observed data.
Several robustness tests have been performed. First,
we have checked that these results are robust when vary-
ing the national field, Fnat, in the same range than the
〈τ〉(N) obtained from empirical curves (i.e., when the
turnout rate spreads from ≈ 20% up to ≈ 90%). Sec-
ond, we have consider the scale parameter s and we
find that the results are in agreement with the empir-
ical regularities for 0.75 <∼ s <∼ 1.15 . Next, instead
of directly introducing the noise in each subgroup (such
that Nℓ+1 = N
2/3
ℓ (1 + η)), we have directly injected the
noise in the number of groups in order to account for
the dispersion in the exponent observed in data. More
precisely a group with Nℓ agents at the level ℓ is di-
rectly split into AN δ subgroups. Simulations retrieve
empiric regularities when 0.28 <∼ δ <∼ 0.35 with A = 1,
and 0.5 <∼ A <∼ 2 with δ = 1/3, which once again is con-
sistent with the assumption ng ≈ N1/3. Finally, we have
also performed simulations replacing the logistic distribu-
tion of the group idiosyncrasy by a Gaussian or bimodal
distribution, in order to verify that the results are inde-
pendent from the particular choice of distribution.
V. CONCLUSION
We have found that the participation in a decision-
making problem, when the N agents have to decide about
an issue that concerns only themselves as a group, shows
a universal population-size effect. More specifically, we
have shown that the average and variance logarithmic
turnout rate (LTR) decrease in the same way with con-
stituency size, irrespective of local particularities. This
contrasts with the fact that the LTR exhibits no such
regularities for national/European elections, when plot-
ted as a function of the population of the same set of
constituencies. This difference indicates that agents in
each municipality may behave as if their group structure
and cohesion becomes important when the object of the
election concerns only themselves as a group. The ob-
served behavior hints at a universal subdivision of the
constituencies in ng ≈ N δ subgroups with δ ≈ 1/3. We
also find a similar universal behavior for the number of
democratic representatives from municipal to national
scales, as a function of the size N of the constituency that
has elected them. These results agree with the study of
the candidature process [10].
A very simple phenomenological model, based on the
existence of groups at all scales with the corresponding
relation ng ≈ N1/3 at each scale, quantitatively agrees
with the observed behavior of the LTR. This idea of a
hierarchy of group-idiosyncrasies has also been shown in
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Ref. [19]. Because in this work we calculate average val-
ues of the LTR over many (typically 100) municipalities
of similar size, our results do not exclude that other fac-
tors might influence the participation rate of a given mu-
nicipality as has been largely studied in Refs. [20, 21].
This work calls for further interdisciplinary research as
the origin of the regularities shown by the data remains
unclear. Moreover, as these results seem to be related to
the representation that N agents have about themselves
as a group, one could ask whether they reflect some in-
trinsic group dynamics that is common to the different
situations we analyzed, as has also been observed in an-
thropological studies [22], or, on the other hand, whether
they reflect the way in which the agents (here humans)
are used to dealing with group classification, as in tax-
onomic and soil classifications studied in Refs. [23, 24].
The latter is suggested by the fact that, if in Eq. (3) we
put nr = N
1/3, the number of agents in one group, N1,
is the geometric mean of N and nr. This can be related
to the logarithmic neural representation of numbers as
discussed in Refs. [25–27].
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APPENDIX
A.1. Materials and methods: Data collection and
treatment
Data used in this work can directly be downloaded
from [15].
1. Local elections study
The studied countries are listed in Table I, and each
election is referred to by its abbreviation and year. Data
have been taken from Austria [28], Costa Rica [29], the
Czech Republic [30], France [31], Israel [32], Poland [33],
Portugal [34], Romania [35], Slovakia [36], and Spain [37].
When dealing with real data some compromise is some-
times needed in order to better fulfill the four conditions
listed in the article. For instance, in France and Roma-
nia, where the local election may require a second round,
only the first round is studied because it occurs in every
municipality of the country. On the other hand, in Spain
we have analyzed only data from the provinces (comu-
nidades auto´nomas) that vote exclusively for local rep-
resentatives on the election date: Andaluc´ıa, Catalun˜a
and Galicia. In Polish elections, the first round is ex-
cluded because it concerns local and regional elections
and we have kept the second round which concerns only
local elections. These considerations lead sometimes to a
lower statistics, e.g. the polish second round takes place
in ≈ 700 and 800 municipalities in the two analyzed elec-
tions. Finally the case of Israel is shown, despite its poor
statistics, because it may help to understand the observed
regularities, as discussed in the main text.
Some remarks on the notation used to describe the
analyzed data:
• In Austria, though the election date may change
from one province to another, we have labeled the
elections in all the provinces with a single date.
• Some Romanian electors, not registered in the lista
electorala permanenta, are able to vote. We do not
consider those electors.
• In one third of the municipalities of the Czech Re-
public, the local election takes place on the same
day as Senate election, and in Romania, the munic-
ipal election and the election concerning represen-
tatives of judet¸e (which are a constituted by a group
of municipalities, except for large cities, where the
corresponding judet¸ has the same size as the city)
are simultaneous. Nevertheless we have integrated
them in the general group (above the horizontal
line of Table I), because we observe that this part
of mixed data does not completely destroy the uni-
versal behavior of LTR.
Each point of Fig. 1 is obtained as the average over 100
municipalities of approximatively the same size, N , with
the exception of France, Poland, and Israel, where each
point represents the average over 200, 50, and 20 munic-
ipalities, respectively. Apart from the two extremal bins,
(largest and smallest municipalities) each municipality is
taken into account twice, i.e., belongs to two neighboring
bins.
In order to get rid of electoral errors, we decide to
exclude the extreme values of the LTR. Let us consider,
for instance, some 100 municipalities of size ≈ N (as in
Fig. 1), and of LTR τi (i = 1, 2, . . . , 100). We denote
by µ0 and σ0 the raw average and standard deviation of
τ over these 100 municipalities. Then, the final average
value 〈τ〉(N) and of the variance σ2τ (N) take only the
municipalities i such that |τi − µ0| < 5σ0 into account.
It results that a very small fraction of data is excluded
(about 2/1000).
2. Study of the number of democratic representatives
We collect data of the number of representatives in
democratic chambers at different scales, national, re-
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gional/state, and municipal, as a function of the total
number of registered voters N or, when unknown, the
corresponding total population.
For “representative” we understand either a particular
(elected) individual that represents a given group of
people that has voted for him or her (as in the case
where distinct constituencies exist and one particular
representative talks in the name of each constituency),
or the situation where a given number of representatives
is attributed to the whole population. This approach
distinguishes neither between councillors and deputies,
nor between representatives directly elected from people
constituency from those elected from their political
parties.
• Municipal Councils
French local councillors (conseillers municipaux) in 2008,
are taken from Ref. [38]. The number of representatives
of municipalities is directly given for Paris, Lyon,
and Marseille, and for the remaining municipalities,
it is given as a function of population range. The
population of these towns comes from a 2011 national
estimation [39]. A similar procedure is followed con-
cerning data about municipal councillors of the seven
La¨nder 3 in Germany where data were accessible [40]
and in Catalonia (in Spain). For the last Czech and
Slovakian local elections, the total number of elected
deputies/councillors for each municipality, as a function
of the N registered voters, is directly obtained from the
corresponding official electoral data set.
• Regional 4 Councils
The analyzed cases are: nine Austrian Chambers (eight
Landtage Parliaments and the Municipal Assembly
of Vienna) [28], 27 Brazilian Assembleias Legislativas
Estaduais, 13 Czech Regional Councils (Zastupitelstva
kraju˙)[41], 26 French Parlements re´gionaux, 16 German
Landesparlamente [42], 21 Italian Consigli regionale [43],
16 Polish Voivodeship Sejmiks (Sejmiki Wojewo´dzkie),
two Assembleias Legislativas regionais (for Ac¸ores and
Madeira) in Portugal [44], 41 Romanian County Coun-
cils (Consilii Judet¸ene) and the Bucharest Municipal
General Council [45], eight Regional Self-Governments in
Slovakia [46], and 17 Spanish Parlamentos autono´micos.
The number N of registered voters is known in every
region.
• National chambers of Deputies
Data concerning 181 democratic countries have been
3 In Brandenburg and Schleswig-Holstein, we arbitrary put the
population limit between Gemeinden and Sta¨dten at 50000.
4 Here by the word “Regional” we mean an intermediate political
organization between municipalities and the whole nation. These
political units have different names and sizes in different coun-
tries, like “states” in the United States, or Re´gions in France,
La¨nder in Germany, etc.
gathered using the sources in Refs. [47, 48], where
we have taken whenever possible, the information
corresponding to the latest election. We do not consider
National Constituent Assemblies. We take into account
the total number N of registered voters per country. In
some few cases this number is estimated, using the same
sources [47, 48].
• Evolution in time of the number of deputies in
the U.S. House of Representatives
The evolution in time of total number of deputies in the
House of Representatives of the United States is the only
empiric case where two important properties meet: (1)
stability of the democratic regime over a long period, and
(2) a significant change of the total population during this
period (here the population has increased in two orders of
magnitude from 1790 up to 2000). Data are taken from
Refs. [49, 50] or directly from Ref. [51], where details on
the considered population, etc., are also given.
Finally, general widespread data like the area and the
nominal gross domestic product (GDP) per country used
here, correspond to 2011/2012.
A.2. A short historical investigation: ancient cities
and the modern USA democracy
We have investigated the number of “representatives”
in ancient cities which had an election procedure of elec-
tion to choose their government, in order to check if they
they also verified the behavior observed for present soci-
eties.
We show examples presenting the following character-
istics: (1) they correspond to different historical periods,
and (2) only assemblies or citizens who directly voted,
acclaimed, etc., their “representatives” are considered, in
order to compare with our contemporary study. Unfor-
tunately, most of the cases do not correspond to this cri-
terion because either there were intermediate structures
between the citizenry and those who held the legitimate
authority (e.g., Geneva in the 17th century had the Petit
Conseil, ≈ 25 members, the Conseil des deux-cents, ≈
200-300 members, and the Conseil ge´ne´ral, ≈ 1500 mem-
bers) or the “body of electors” was composed by members
of different social status (e.g. the popolo grasso and the
popolo minuto in Florence in the 14th century).
In Sparta, the citizens who corresponded to the ho-
plites elected five ephors for one year ([52], pp. 161-210).
To have an approach as precise as possible of the num-
ber of Spartan citizens, we chose the 480 BC period, be-
cause it was the peak of the Sparta’s military and po-
litical power, with 8000 hoplites according to Herodotus
([53], VII, 234), and 371 BC when Sparta entered its de-
cline with the defeat in Leuctra( [54], VI, 4-15), where
there were only 800 hoplites ([52], p. 269).
For the Athenian democracy, in the 5th century BC,
we used the Dictionary of Antiquity published by the
University of Oxford [55]. Thus, we could identify the
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FIG. 12. (Color online) (A) Total number of “representa-
tives” with regard to the corresponding total number of citi-
zens, N , from old cities and from a dialogue/utopia written in
Antic Greece. Councillors from Slovakia Republic in current-
day municipalities (in Fig. 7A) are also plotted as a guide
view. (B) Evolution in time of nr with respect to the popu-
lation in United States from 1790 to 2000 (each point corre-
sponds to 10 years, except for 1920). The line corresponds to
the power-law fit in the legend.
population ([55], pp. 802-803) and with more specific
entries about ekklesia ([55], p. 348) or the boule ([55],
p. 154) we could clarify the overall organization of the
Athens constitution [56]. On the Pnyx which was the
official place where the citizens gathered, there could not
be more than 6000 citizens because it was the maximum
number of people who could really gather there to elect
10 strategists for one year.
Medieval Geneva had a population of about 5000 in-
habitants in the 14th and 15th centuries [57], and all the
male inhabitants could participate in the political life.
Thus, about 2000 active citizens can be expected to have
elected four syndics for one year ([58], pp.13-14).
As for the colony of Virginia, in 1619 there was es-
tablished a House of Burgesses composed of 22 members
directly elected by all the free men over 17, Protestants,
and property owners [59, 60]. As the population was 1277
people in 1624 [61], we can assume that the active citizens
who participated in the elections of their representatives
were about 600.
The last example comes from the dialogue/utopia Laws
by Plato, and particularly in books V and VI. The city of
Magnesia should have 37 guardians of the laws from the
around 15000 citizens (see Ref. [62], section Annexes I,
from which we have taken a low number of the estimated
number of citizens).
Fig. 12A plots the number of “representatives” with
respect to the number of citizens, N . It appears that
regularities observed in present data (i.e. nr ≈ Nγ , with
γ ≈ 1/3) do not hold at all for these old cities. This is
probably due to the fact that, though those ancient cities
elected their “representatives”, the nature of their politic
regime was different from our representative democracy.
On the other hand, a better fit is observed for the evo-
lution of the number of congressmen in the United States
with respect to the evolution of the population of the
country over time (this country shows a large increase
in population along with a stable democratic system).
Fig. 12B shows that it follows the same trend than reg-
ularities observed in present data until the beginning of
the 20th century, when the number of congressmen last
changed.
[1] C. Castellano, S. Fortunato, V. Loreto, Rev. Mod. Phys.
81, 591-646 (2009).
[2] J-.P. Bouchaud, J. Stat. Phys. 151, 567-606 (2013).
[3] R. N. Costa Filho, M. P. Almeida, J. S. Andrade Jr., J.
E. Moreira, Phys. Rev. E 60, 1067-1068 (1999).
[4] M. L. Lyra, U. M. S. Costa, R. N. Costa Filho, J. S.
Andrade, Eur. Phys. Lett. 62, 131-137 (2003).
[5] S. Fortunato, C. Castellano, Phys. Rev. Lett. 99, 138701
(2007).
[6] H. Herna´ndez-Saldan˜a, Physica A 388, 2699-2704 (2009).
[7] L.E. Araripe, R.N. Costa Filho, Physica A 388, 4167-
4170 (2009).
[8] C. Borghesi, J.-P. Bouchaud, Eur. Phys. J. B 75, 395-404
(2010).
[9] N. A. M. Arau´jo, J. S. Andrade Jr., H. J. Herrmann,
PLoS ONE 5, e12446 (2010).
[10] M. C. Mantovani H. V. Ribeiro, M. V. Moro, S. Picoli
Jr., R. S. Mendes, Eur. Phys. Lett. 96, 48001 (2011).
[11] C. Borghesi, J.-C. Raynal, J.-P. Bouchaud, PLoS ONE
7, e36289 (2012).
[12] C. Borghesi, J. Chiche, J.-P. Nadal, PLoS ONE 7, e39916
(2012).
[13] A. Chatterjee, M. Mitrovic´, S. Fortunato, Sci. Rep. 3,
1049 (2013); A. Chatterjee, M. Mitrovic´, S. Fortunato,
Sci. Rep. 3, 1155 (2013).
[14] M. C. Mantovani, H. V. Ribeiro, E. K. Lenzi, S. Picoli,
Jr. and R. S. Mendes, Phys. Rev. E 88, 024802 (2013).
[15] http://www.u-cergy.fr/fr/laboratoires/labo-lptm/donnees-de-recherche.html
[16] C. Borghesi, Une e´tude de physique sur les e´lections (Ed.
Univ. Europ., Saarbru¨cken, 2010).
13
[17] P. Klimek, Y. Yegorov, R. Hanel, S. Thurner, Proc. Natl.
Acad. Sci. USA 109, 16469-16473 (2012).
[18] G. Toulouse, J. Bok, Rev. Franc¸. Socio. 19, 391-406
(1978).
[19] L. Valori, F. Picciolo, A. Allansdottir, D. Garlaschelli,
Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 109, 1068-1073 (2012).
[20] N.M. Franklin, C. Van Der Eijk, D. Evans, M. Fotos, W.
Hirczy De Mino, M. Marsh, B. Wessels Voter Turnout
and the Dynamics of Electoral Competition in Established
Democracies since 1945 (Cambridge University Press,
Cambridge, 2004).
[21] B. Geys, Electoral Studies 25, 637-663 (2006).
[22] M.A. Kline, R. Boyd, Proc. R. Soc. London Ser. B 277,
2559-2564 (2010).
[23] C. Caretta Cartozo, D. Garlaschelli, C. Ricotta, M.
Barthe´le´my, G. Caldarelli, J. Phys. A 41, 224012 (2008).
[24] J.J. Ibanez, R.W. Arnold, R.J. Ahrens, Ecol. Complex.
6, 286-293 (2009).
[25] S. Dehaene, V. Izard, E. Spelke, P. Pica, Science 320,
1217-1220 (2008).
[26] C. Gros, G. Kaczor, D. Markovic´, Eur. Phys. J. B 85:28
(2012).
[27] P. Sobkowicz, M. Thelwall, K. Buckley, G. Paltoglou,
A.Sobkowicz, EPJ Data Sci. 2:2 (2013).
[28] http://www.bmi.gv.at/cms/BMI wahlen/
[29] http://www.consulta.tse.go.cr/estadisticas elecciones.htm
[30] http://www.volby.cz
[31] http://www.interieur.gouv.fr/Elections/Les-resultats
[32] http://www.moin.gov.il/Subjects/Bchirot/Pages/resultmekomi.aspx
[33] http://pkw.gov.pl/wyniki-wyborow-i-referendow/wybory-i-referenda.html
[34] http://eleicoes.cne.pt/
[35] http://www.beclocale2012.ro/rezultate.html
[36] http://portal.statistics.sk/showdoc.do?docid=5673
[37] http://www.infoelectoral.mir.es/min/
[38] http://www.politiquemania.com/nombre-conseillers-municipaux-par-commune.html
[39] http://professionnels.ign.fr/rgc
[40] http://www.wahlrecht.de/kommunal/
[41] http://www.volby.cz/index en.htm
[42] http://www.wahlrecht.de/ergebnisse/index.htm
[43] http://elezionistorico.interno.it/
[44] http://www.cne.pt/
[45] http://www.beclocale2012.ro/
[46] http://portal.statistics.sk/showdoc.do?docid=3090
[47] http://www.ipu.org/parline/
[48] http://africanelections.tripod.com/
[49] http://www.thirty-thousand.org/pages/analyses.htm
[50] https://pantherfile.uwm.edu/margo/www/apport
/datasets.htm
[51] www.uwm.edu/ margo/apport/apportionment1.pdf
[52] Edmond Levy, Sparte, Histoire politique et sociale jusqu’a`
la conqueˆte romaine (Ed. Seuil, Paris, 2003).
[53] He´rodote, L’enqueˆte (translated by A. Barguet, Ed. Gal-
limard, Paris, 1990).
[54] Xe´nophon, Helle´niques (translated by E. Talbot, Ed.
Gallimard, Paris, 2012).
[55] M. C. Howatson, University of Oxford, Dictionnaire de
lAntiquite´ (Collection Bouquin, Paris, 1993).
[56] Aristote, Constitution d’Athe`nes (translated by G. Math-
ieu, B. Haussoulier, and C. Mosse´, Ed. Les Belles-Lettres,
Paris, 1996).
[57] Dictionnaire historique de la Suisse, www.hls-dhs-
dss.ch/textes/f/F2903.php
[58] L. Binz, Bre`ve histoire de Gene`ve (Chancellerie de
Gene`ve, Geneva, 2000).
[59] http://www.49online.org/webpages/nschumacher/index.cfm?subpage=506084
[60] http://www.statemaster.com/encyclopedia/House-of-Burgesses
[61] http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History of Virginia
[62] Platon, Les Lois (translated by L. Brisson and J.-F.
Pradeau, Ed. Flammarion, Paris, 2006).
